underpinning the simulation endeavor. Although supercomputing and networking have advanced to the point where "large-scale simulations [can be] performed on remote supercomputers" (Obeysekare, Grinstein, & Patnaik, 1997, p. 63) , the theoretical foundations of computer simulation still remain in an underdeveloped state. There have been various attempts to provide computer simulation with a theoretical framework by the application of philosophy of science to simulation validation (see Herskovitz, 1991; Kleindorfer, O'Neill, & Ganeshan, 1998 ; see also Barlas & Carpenter, 1990; Birta & Özmizrak, 1996; Bohlin, 1994; Dijkum, DeTombe, & Kuijk, 1999; P. N. Edwards, 1999; Feinstein & Cannon, 2003; Kleindorfer & Ganeshan, 1993; Refsgaard & Henriksen, 2002; Vangheluwe, Lara, & Mosterman, 2002; Wilson, 1997) , with early work being done in the 1960s (see Naylor, Balintfy, Burdick, & Chu, 1966; Naylor & Finger, 1967) . The aim of this article is to contribute to these efforts.
Specifically, this article discusses the key elements of Popper's theory of falsification and explores how simulation validation is in fact anchored to Popper's theory. Moreover, we suggest that a Popperian perspective encourages the review of a validated model's continuing validity, thereby potentially leading to the construction of a new, improved model. Finally, in arguing that Popperian falsificationism is the appropriate theoretical framework for computer simulation validation, we contrast Popper's falsificationist philosophy of science with Quine's philosophical system of holism and early-period Putnam's scientific realism, 1 both of which discourage the building of better models.
The computer simulation validation endeavor and philosophy of science
Simulation validation has been defined as the "substantiation that a computer model, within its domain of applicability, possesses a satisfactory range of accuracy consistent with the intended application of the model" (Knepell & Arangno, 1993, chap. 1, p. 3) and generally involves a comparison of "the output data generated by the simulation model with the output data expected from or generated by the real world system" (Herskovitz, 1991, p. 56 ; see also Law & Kelton, 2000) .
2 At its very basic, then, "validation is the process of determining whether the model reflects reality" (Rohrer, 2000 (Rohrer, , p. 1213 .
As an activity that plays a critical role in decision making and problem solving in our information technological age, computer simulation validation warrants a welldeveloped theoretical base. This article represents an attempt toward achieving that goal. The search for the theoretical roots of computer simulation validation leads to the realm of philosophy of science, which concerns itself with the question of whether scientific theories "can be taken to reveal the truth about a hidden objective reality" (Flew, 1979, p. 320 ; see also Curd & Cover, 1998; Laudan, 1990) . One of the questions that philosophy of science, then, seeks to answer is "When do empirical data provide a good test of, or reliable evidence for, a scientific hypothesis?" (Mayo, 2000, p. S193; see also Glymour, 1980; Koslowski, 1996) .
Disparate disciplines have drawn on philosophy of science to examine issues relating to method, theory, proof, and the nature of knowledge. By way of illustration, recent work on the intersection of law and philosophy of science has focused on the validity and reliability of scientific knowledge and the legal rules concerning the admissibility and evaluation of evidence presented at trial (e.g., see Crump, 2003; Imwinkelried, 2003; LaRue & Caudill, 2004; Rice, 2003; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993; Farrell, 1994; Foster & Huber, 1999; Haack, 2003; Mason, 2001; McLean v. Arkansas, 1982; Moenssens, 1997; Quinn, 1984; Ruse, 1996) . 3 In fact, the United States Supreme Court, in the landmark Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) case, has adopted Popper's falsificationist philosophy of science as law with respect to the admissibility of expert evidence (see Bernstein, 1994; Edmond, 2003; Edmond & Mercer, 2002; Faigman, 2000; Feldman, 1995; Golanski, 2001; Haack, 2001, in press; Mason, 2001; Nance, 2003; O'Connor, 1995) . In the field of IS, researchers have applied philosophy of science to information system design (e.g., see Gregory, 1995 Gregory, , 1996 Ulrich, 1994 Ulrich, , 2001 . Moreover, Lee, Barua, and Whinston (1997) "call[ed] for a richer theoretical foundation for developing causal models" in the management information systems (MIS) discipline and suggested a "conceptual foundation" that in part is "based on philosophy of science" (p. 111). Building on the relatively small number of studies viewing computer simulation through the lens of philosophy of science (e.g., see Herskovitz, 1991; Kleindorfer et al., 1998) , we will explore the contrasting philosophies of science of Popper, Quine, and early-period Putnam to provide computer simulation validation with a theoretical framework.
According to Crookall, Oxford, and Saunders (1987) , the simulation model (or for that matter, any model) "abstracts from the real system by way of conceptualization, selection and simplification. A model necessarily embodies a theory about the system it maps" (p. 151). Kleindorfer et al. (1998) suggested, The validation problem in simulation is an explicit recognition that simulation models are like miniature scientific theories. Each of them is a set of propositions about how a particular manufacturing or service system works. As such, the warrant we give for these models can be discussed in the same terms that we use in scientific theorizing in general. (p. 1087) Similarly, Colburn (2000) viewed simulation as an experimental science whereby a computer program is run "to test a hypothesis in a computer model of reality" (p. 172).
A Popperian falsificationist perspective
Viewing simulation models as minitheories, Herskovitz (1991) proposed Popper's falsificationism as a theoretical framework for simulation validation. According to Popper's approach of falsificationism, all scientific theories must be constructed in such a way so that they are falsifiable or refutable, thereby putting themselves at risk (Popper, 1934 (Popper, /1959 (Popper, , 1965 ; see also Haack, 1993, pp. 96-102) . This notion follows from Popper's view that science, progressing by trial and error, consists of conjectures and refutations. For Popper (1965) , scientific theories are "inventions-conjectures boldly put forward for trial, to be eliminated if they clashed with observations" (p. 46). Thus, a theory is scientific only if it makes specific predictions whose nonoccurrence will discredit it. Theories then are subject to being falsified upon the observation of a single counterinstance. For example, a theory that posits that all swans are white will be discarded upon the sighting of a sole black swan. Although conceding "that even falsifications are never absolute, or quite certain" (Popper, 1983 , p. 187), Popper (1934 /1959 ) maintained that as a matter of convention (decision rule), falsified theories must be rejected conclusively. Consequently, a counterinstance is fatal to a theory. For Popper, it is the falsifiability, or refutability, of the theory that is the demarcation criterion distinguishing science from nonscience (metaphysics and pseudoscience).
Under a Popperian approach, a theory should be submitted to "severe tests," and if it passes such tests by remaining not falsified, it is viewed as only a conjecture that will do for now, a mere tentative representation of reality. This theory is never regarded as conclusively proven or verified for in the future it may be refuted, or disconfirmed, by a report of a contrary observation. In Popperian terminology, such an unfalsified theory is referred to as merely "corroborated" (Popper, 1934 (Popper, /1959 . For Popper (1934 /1959 , the greater "the severity of the various tests" that a theory has withstood, the higher the degree of corroboration (p. 267). However, that a theory is highly corroborated does not justify the conclusion that the theory is probably true (see also Howie, 2002; Putnam, 1974) . Popper (1982) argued for the provisional and imperfect nature of theories thus: I see our scientific theories as human inventions-nets designed by us to catch the world. . . . Theories are not only instruments. What we aim at is truth: we test our theories in the hope of eliminating those which are not true. In this way we may succeed in improving our theories-even as instruments: in making nets which are better and better adapted to catch our fish, the real world. Yet they will never be perfect instruments for this purpose. They are rational nets of our own making, and should not be mistaken for a complete representation of the real world in all its aspects; not even if they are highly successful; not even if they appear to yield excellent approximations to reality. (pp. 42-43) Writing in Popperian overtones-from the vantage point of a physicist-on the confluence of computer technology and the sciences of complexity, Pagels (1989) described scientific research thus:
Scientific inquiry is successful because it is, like the evolutionary process, a powerfully selective system. Scientific theories, by design, are always vulnerable to destruction just like a species, subjected to environmental pressure, is subject to extinction. Because of that vulnerability, scientific truth has the strength that comes of survival in a challenging environment. The skills of the scientist . . . are practiced in the arena of intense criticism and experimental test-they are vulnerable to challenge and challenged they are. (p. 161) In practice, the researcher designs and conducts an experiment to test the research, or scientific, hypothesis and typically evaluates the resultant data by using classical statistical hypothesis testing (also referred to as statistical significance testing and null hypothesis statistical testing), 4 which requires the derivation of a statistical hypothesis from the research hypothesis. The statistical hypothesis is generally expressed as the negation of the research hypothesis and is referred to as the null hypothesis (H 0 ) because it states that there is no difference, effect, or change as a result of the experimental treatment. The null hypothesis is to be tested against its logical complement, the alternative hypothesis (H 1 or H A ), which states that there is a difference, effect, or change as a result of the experimental treatment. 5 The alternative hypothesis then usually-but not always-is the research hypothesis, or substantive theory, that the researcher is attempting to "corroborate."
6 The null and alternative hypotheses are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive (see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991, p. 39) . After the formulation of the null and alternative hypotheses, the researcher must choose a level of significance (α) to determine whether any observed differences between the treatment and control groups are due to random variation or chance. According to Berenson, Levine, and Goldstein (1983) , "Since the level of significance represents the risk to the researcher of rejecting a true null hypothesis, α levels chosen either as .05 or .01 have been traditionally considered adequate for most testing purposes" (p. 16).
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Classical statistical hypothesis testing, grounded in the work of Fisher (1922 Fisher ( , 1925 Fisher ( , 1935 and Neyman and Pearson (1928a , 1928b , 1933 , is a falsificationist enterprise along Popperian lines in that the aim of the researcher is to reject the null hypothesis. In fact, Fisher (1935) asserted that "every experiment may be said to exist only in order to give the facts a chance of disproving the null hypothesis" (p. 16). If the researcher is successful in achieving this objective, then by inference, the alternative hypothesis is accepted tentatively (see Minium, King, & Bear, 1993 ; see also Trout, 1998) . If however the researcher fails to reject the null hypothesis, such failure does not mean that the null hypothesis is proven true but rather merely indicates that there is insufficient evidential support to reject the null hypothesis, and hence the null hypothesis is retained.
Popper recognized the logical difficulty of converting a research hypothesis, which is deterministic in form, into a null hypothesis, which is probabilistic, and offered a solution: For an event with an exceedingly low probability of occurrence, the probability of that event's occurrence is treated as zero. (Note that the deterministic hypothesis is a special case of the probabilistic hypothesis.) In The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper (1934 Popper ( /1959 discussed the role of statistical tests in the process of hypothesis falsification:
[The researcher] is usually quite well able to decide whether he may for the time being accept some particular probability hypothesis as "empirically confirmed", or whether he ought to reject it as "practically falsified", i.e., as useless for purposes of prediction. It is fairly clear that this "practical falsification" can be obtained only through a methodological decision to regard highly improbable events as ruled out-as prohibited. (p. 191) Thus, by applying a pragmatic methodological decision rule whereby events with low probabilities of occurrence are deemed as being events whose occurrence is impossi- Popper's falsificationism is a revolutionary view of science. It runs counter to the traditional verificationist view-rooted in the 17th-century rationalism of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz (e.g., see Santillana & Zilsel, 1941) ; the classical empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and John Stuart Mill (e.g., see Himsworth, 1986; Santillana & Zilsel, 1941) ; and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle (e.g., see Hanfling, 1981; Joergensen, 1951 )-which has posited that science proceeds by inductive generalizations so that theories can be conclusively verified or proven by virtue of accumulated observations (see Kleindorfer et al., 1998) . For verificationists, it is the use of the inductive method that is the demarcation criterion distinguishing science from nonscience. Redman (1991) encapsulated the verificationist position thus:
The scientist proposes a theory on the basis of inductive logic and confirms or refutes the theory by experimental test of the predictions deductively derived from the theory. It is assumed that appraisal of theories or hypotheses follows from an application of scientific rules; that is, the justification of a statement is either inferred from principles (rationalism) or inferred from evidence (empiricism). New theories are adopted because of their greater explanatory power, and thus science progresses ever closer to the truth. (p. 3) According to Popper, the verificationist view rests on a shaky foundation because generalizations from past observations are extrapolated beyond what was observed, thus transcending experience because the generalizations are not based on all possible observations. This logical difficulty with the verificationist position has been referred to as "Hume's problem of induction."
It is not logically justified, for example, to conclude that all swans are white after observing a finite number of white swans, no matter how numerous, because it is still possible for a black swan to be sighted in the future. Popper's solution to the heretofore unsolved problem of induction is the falsifiability principle. Thus, to refer back to our example, after the sighting of swans of no other color but white, the theory that all swans are white is not conclusively proven as true (via induction) but is merely regarded as not yet falsified. Popper's revolutionary insight was that science does not proceed by induction but rather by the trial-and-error approach of falsification. Accordingly, scientists do not verify theories but merely falsify them. Herskovitz (1991) , suggesting that developers of simulation models are in fact Popperian falsificationists, made the following argument:
Simulationists proceed by a method of conjectures and refutations. They propose tentative models and subject them to comparisons with real world systems. If the output data generated by the simulation model are consistent with the output data expected from or generated by the real world system, the model is not rejected but accepted as "valid" for the time being. However, in fact, the truth of the model cannot be logically inferred from real world observations. If the output data of the simulation model are at variance with the output data from the real world system, the model is falsified and another tentative simulation model must be proposed. (p. 58) Thus, contrary to a verificationist perspective of science, which would view "[computer simulation] validation as an absolute" (Kleindorfer et al., 1998 (Kleindorfer et al., , p. 1090 , a Popperian falsificationist approach would regard a validated model as merely valid for now, a provisional representation of reality. Moreover, a validated model is one that is merely "sufficiently accurate for the purpose at hand [italics added]" (Carson, 1986, p. 74) .
9 According to Balci and Sargent (1981) , "The validity of a simulation model is tested under a given experimental frame and for an acceptable range of accuracy related to the purpose for which the model is intended" (p. 190). 10 Rao, Owen, and Goldsman (1998) cited Shannon (1975) for the Popperian suggestion that although a model does not represent absolute truth, the simulation modeling endeavor involves searching for "a succession of theories that will progressively approach the truth" (p. 1080).
A Popperian stance of regarding validated simulation models as merely provisionally true encourages review of the continuing validity of models and thus leads to model improvement. Conditions may have changed after the initial validation of a model, and accordingly, the model may need to be reassessed at periodic intervals. Sargent (1999 Sargent ( , 2000 in fact advocated a Popperian attitude in suggesting that "if the model is to be used over a period of time, develop a schedule for periodic review of the model's validity" (p. 46 and p. 57, respectively; see also Centeno & Carrillo, 2001; Sadowski & Grabau, 2000) . Elaborating on the reasons for revisiting a model's validity, Sargent (1999) argued thus:
Models occasionally are developed to be used more than once. A procedure for reviewing the validity of these models over their life cycles needs to be developed. . . . No general procedure can be given, as each situation is different. For example, if no data were available on the system when a model was initially developed and validated, then revalidation of the model should take place prior to each usage of the model if new data or system understanding has occurred since its last validation. (p. 47; see also Sargent, 2000) Birta and Özmizrak (1996) adopted Herskovitz's (1991) view that simulation validation is an application of Popperian falsification as "the basis for [their] approach to the validation problem for simulation models" (p. 79). For Kleindorfer et al. (1998) , such a Popperian approach to computer simulation validation "is a good way to understand what comes into play in the formulation of most simulation models" (p. 1093; see also . As a practical matter, then, simulation model developers employ a Popperian falsificationist approach whereby they adopt a decision rule-a "reasoned convention" (Laudan, 1990, p. 88 )-of regarding as falsified a tested model that is found not to conform to the real system and regarding as validated only for the time being and under current conditions a tested model that is found to conform to the real system. It is such a Popperian stance that makes progress possible in computer simulation.
Such progress however can be thwarted by various external factors, for example, "political interests and pressures, including ethical and policy limitations, economic interests, funding bias, fraud, bad or misleading instruments and models, greed, ambition, rhetoric and persuasion, gender or racial bias, and general cultural values" (Caudill, 2002, p. 277) .
11 Popperian falsificationism assumes-and indeed mandates-that researchers earnestly and objectively put their own theories at risk and attempt to falsify them by making specific predictions whose nonoccurrence will result in the theories' refutation. In the context of computer simulation validation, there are two behaviors that will especially undermine the Popperian falsificationist approach: intentional model "cooking" and unintentional self-deception (Wilson, 1997) . The intentional cooking of simulation models occurs when in response to client or sponsor pressure, model developers "fudge . . .
[their] models to yield anticipated or desired results" (Wilson, 1997 (Wilson, , p. 1408 . According to Wilson (1997) , "With the advent of powerful special-and general-purpose simulation environments including extensive animation capabilities, such model-cooking is far easier for simulationists to carry out than it is for, say, atmospheric physicists" (p. 1408).
The second behavior that subverts Popperian falsificationism is "the unintentional self-deception resulting from faulty output analysis" (Wilson, 1997 (Wilson, , p. 1408 . Wilson (1997) explained how this self-delusion can afflict model developers:
In the context of simulation experiments, animation can be one of the primary visual means for self-deception. Equally dangerous is faulty output analysis based on visual inspection of correlograms, histograms, confidence intervals, etc., computed from an inadequate volume of simulation-generated data. With all of these simulation tools, there is the ever-present danger of seeing things that simply do not exist or of not seeing things that do exist. (p. 1408) To avoid the twin dangers of model cooking and self-deception, Wilson (1997) suggested the following:
Simulationists should place much greater emphasis on meaningful, honest validation of their models as accurate representations of the corresponding target systems. To reemphasize the role of validation in the field of computer simulation, we need fundamental advances in both the practice and theory of model validation. . . . We need to pay much greater attention to simulation model validation in teaching and research as well as in practical applications. (p. 1408) In addition to intentional model cooking and unintentional self-deception, an external factor that may undercut Popperian falsificationism and thereby hinder progress in computer simulation is the law of intellectual property. Computer simulation validation occurs within a legal environment wherein intellectual property law confers exclusive rights in original works of authorship and derivative works (copyright protection for simulation software) and in discoveries and inventions (patent protection for simulation hardware) to researchers and scientists (see Newberg & Dunn, 2002) . "The granting of a temporary monopoly in the form of a copyright promotes creative activity by providing economic incentive, but more importantly ensures that the public will have unfettered access to the work after a limited period of time" (Harney, 2002, p. 299) .
12 Similarly, according to Eisenberg (1989) ,
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In analyzing how patents promote scientific progress, the courts have emphasized two mechanisms: first, the prospect of obtaining a patent monopoly provides an incentive to invest in research to make new inventions; and second, the patent system promotes disclosure of new inventions and thereby enlarges the public storehouse of knowledge. (p. 1024)
With respect to scientific progress in computer simulation, copyright and patent protection are a two-edged sword. Model developers and model sponsors have an economic incentive to build and to improve models because they will be allowed to receive a fair return on their investment without fear that others "who have not shared in the costs of invention" (Eisenberg, 1989 (Eisenberg, , p. 1025 will appropriate original software and hardware related to the computer simulation. However, others will be inhibited from improving these models because of the legal constraints against copyright and patent infringement (e.g., see Oddi, 2002) . 13 To this extent, then, copyrights and patents clash with the Popperian falsificationist norm of science wherein scientists are expected to criticize and challenge each other's work and attempt to refute each other's theories (see Rai, 1999) .
A Quinean holistic perspective
Surprisingly, scant mention and little scrutiny have been given to the rival philosophy of science of Quine-holism-in terms of computer simulation validation. Anderson (1987) recognized that the views of Quine, as well as other philosophers of science, need to be taken into account in providing justification for the methodology of simulation. In adumbrating possible philosophical roots of computer simulation validation, Barlas and Carpenter (1990) speculated that emerging "relativist philosophies" such as that of Popper and Quine, inter alia, may hold promise as perspectives for simulation validation, but the authors of the study have not fully developed their own suggestion. Under such approaches, according to Barlas and Carpenter, models are not regarded as absolutely true but rather "lie on a continuum of usefulness" (p. 157). Wilson (1997) suggested that simulation researchers give scholarly attention to the Duhem-Quine thesis, named after Duhem (1914 Duhem ( /1954 and Quine (1964) , who independently formulated this eponymous problem in the philosophy of science (Quine, 2004, p. 58) . For Rhoads and Thorn (1996) , the Duhem-Quine problem "represents the greatest challenge to Popper's falsification methodology" because this thesis posits "that a favored theory can always be defended against disconfirmation by modifying an auxiliary hypothesis" (p. 29), and hence no falsification can be deemed conclusive. According to the Duhem-Quine thesis, then, researchers need to cast a suspicious eye on all falsifications as well as on all verifications. (See discussion that follows.)
In their exhaustive review of various philosophy of science positions with respect to simulation validation, Kleindorfer et al. (1998) made no mention of Quine except for a brief passage concerning the Duhem-Quine thesis within the context of the philosophy of science of Lakatos (1970) . Although Herskovitz (1991) provided a Popperian philosophy of science perspective on simulation validation, the study has not considered a Quinean alternative. To redress this imbalance, we will consider-and ultimately
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reject-a Quinean approach to simulation validation. Specifically, we will offer a Quinean philosophy of science as a counterpoint to a Popperian one. Expanding on the work of Herskovitz (1991) and heeding the calls of Anderson (1987) , Barlas and Carpenter (1990) , and Wilson (1997), we will argue that the Popperian approach is the appropriate one-and is the one actually used-for simulation validation by contrasting it with a Quinean perspective.
Quine, as well as Popper, is a nonfoundationalist, claiming that knowledge is not based on a secure foundation (Quine, 1969 ; see also Haack, 1993; Kleindorfer et al., 1998) , and it is Quine's nonfoundationalism that informs his philosophy of science. Traditionally, epistemology-the branch of philosophy that concerns itself with the study of knowledge-has attempted to place knowledge on a firm foundation by finding logical justifications for our beliefs. Holding that this project has been a failure, Quine advocated that epistemology should be "naturalized" by "study[ing] the psychological processes that take us from sensory stimulations to beliefs about the world" (Feldman, 2001 , sec. 2, para. 1), thereby "surrender[ing] the epistemological burden to psychology" (Quine, 1969, p. 75) . In an oft-quoted remark, Quine succinctly stated his position thus: "The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle for psychology?" (p. 75).
14 For Quine, neither verification (via induction) nor falsification is the hallmark of science. According to Quine (1964) , unlike Popper, there is no demarcation criterion distinguishing science from nonscience (see also Laudan, 1990; Smart, 1969) . In fact, Quine asserted that there is no sharp distinction between the disciplines of science and philosophy, the latter lying "at the abstract and theoretical end of science" (Magee, 1978, p. 170) . Like Popper's falsificationism, Quine's holism is an attack on the traditional verificationist approach to science. Quine (1974) agreed with Popper that a theory can never be proven true. However, contrary to Popper, Quine held that neither can a theory be proven false, refusing to adopt Popper's convention of eliminating a theory on the basis of a sole counterinstance (Quine, 1990) . Consistent with his nonfoundationalist view of knowledge and the skeptical stance inherent in his naturalized epistemology, Quine (1964) asserted that all observational evidence, positive or negative, is ambiguous, and hence all verifications and all falsifications are not conclusive. According to Quine's holistic perspective, each theory is embedded in a network or "convergence" of various individual hypotheses and beliefs (see Borradori, 1991 Borradori, / 1994 , including those concerning methodological assumptions. It follows then that on a Quinean view, "scientific statements [in a theory] are not separately vulnerable to adverse observations" (Quine, 1975, p. 313) , but rather, in Quine's memorable phrase, "our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body" (Quine, 1964, p. 41) . Flew (1979) encapsulated Quine's holistic approach to theories thus: " [Quine's] model for a scientific theory is that of an interconnected web, with no part immune to revision in the light of experience, and no experience forcing rejection of just one part" (p. 297). Thus for Quine, no theory should be abandoned because of a single counterinstance.
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Quine's (1964) reasoning, contained in his principle of universal revisability, is that a theory can never be falsified because it can always be revised or adjusted by postobservation explanations "excusing the failure of [the theory's] predictions" (Quine & Ullian, 1970, p. 50) . These explanations are referred to as ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses, 15 hypotheses brought in "for the sole purpose of saving a [theory] seriously threatened by adverse evidence" (Hempel, 1966, p. 29) . Holding that "no statement is immune to revision," Quine (1964) asserted that "any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system" (p. 43). Put another way, a counterinstance cannot falsify a theory because explanations may be provided for the report of a contrary observation. This notion of rescuing a theory by introducing a new auxiliary hypothesis is referred to as the Duhem-Quine thesis. Quine and Ullian (1970) offered the following example of how the introduction of ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses can save a theory from refutation:
Consider . . . the hypothesis that pure water under 760 millimeters pressure boils at 100°C
. Suppose that a quantity of what we take to be very pure water under pressure of very nearly 760 is found to boil at 92°C. What conflict are not merely (a) the hypothesis and (b) the boiling at 92°C. Two further parties to the conflict immediately stand forth: the belief that (c) the water was pure and (d) the pressure was close enough to 760. Discarding the hypothesis is one way of maintaining consistency, but there are others. In the imagined case, of course, no scientist would reject the hypotheses, because it is such a highly accredited part of chemistry. If a particular experiment yields results inconsistent with the theory, the researcher cannot know-with-certainty whether it is the theory, measures, procedures, or some auxiliary hypotheses at fault. Therefore, no theory can be conclusively disproved in the same sense as a mathematical proof/disproof. (p. 357) 16 Considering our previous example, the sighting of a black swan will not conclusively refute the theory that all swans are white because the black swan sighted may have in fact been a white swan that was blackened by having encountered mud or black dye.
We argue that the activity of computer simulation validation does not follow a Quinean script when attempts to validate a model fail. (If an attempt to validate a model succeeds, then a Quinean approach, like a Popperian one, views the validation inconclusively, with the validated model being regarded as merely-to borrow a phrase from Quine-"the best we can muster at the time" [Quine, 1960, p. 22] .) We suggest that in actual practice, if the output data of the computer simulation model differ from the output data of the real-world system, the model is falsified in accordance with Popper and thereby definitively rejected. Another model needs to be proposed. There is no Quinean uncertainty concerning the falsification and rejection of the model, and there are no efforts made to save the falsified model. The falsified model is
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conclusively rejected, and the model developer, having reasonable confidence in the model's falsification and consequent rejection, must begin anew and construct an alternative model. A Quinean approach to computer simulation validation would, in contrast to a Popperian philosophy of science, cast into doubt the rejection of the model, thereby hindering the construction of new, potentially better models.
An early-period Putnamean perspective
The literature examining the various philosophies of science as theoretical foundations for computer simulation is silent on Putnam, with the notable exception of Anderson (1987) . This curious omission reflects a considerable gap in the literature. Putnam's scientific realism of his early-period writings merits serious consideration as it is a well-developed and well-articulated position and is representative of the many versions of scientific realism (e.g., see Boyd, 1983 Boyd, , 1984 Leplin, 1984; McMullin, 1984) , a dominant perspective in contemporary philosophy of science (Dogan, 2002; Hunt, 1991; Meehl, 1986; Suppe, 1977) . Moreover, an examination of early-period Putnam's philosophy of science will demonstrate why it is inappropriate as a theory for computer simulation validation.
According to McMullin (1984) , what all the formulations of scientific realism, also referred to as traditional or metaphysical realism, have in common is the notion "that the long term success of a scientific theory gives reason to believe that something like the entities and structure postulated by the theory actually exists" (p. 26). Under Putnam's scientific realist approach, scientific theories with long records of predictive success are true or approximately true (see Putnam, 1975c ; see also Laudan, 1990; Putnam, 1975b Putnam, , 1978 , and the entities referred to therein are real, even if unobservable (see Patterson, 2003) . For Putnam, "in any mature and well-developed science later theories entail at least approximations to their predecessors," with "science through time . . . moving closer and closer to a correct characterization of the natural world" (Laudan, 1990, p. 17) .
Like verificationism, Putnam's scientific realism is a foundationalist position in that it aims for "the development of a method for producing knowledge from foundations that would invariably produce certain knowledge" (Hunt, 1991, p. 240) . The fundamental difference between verificationism and early-period Putnamean scientific realism is in their conception of truth. The verificationist position holds that truth is solely dependent on what can be verified by experience or observation. In marked contrast to verificationism, scientific realism posits that a statement is true only if it corresponds to the way the world actually is and not merely because the statement can be verified by our experience or observation. 17 Moreover, "our language and theory 'mirror'the external world and therefore the truth of our claims consists of their resembling (i.e., corresponding to) the things in the world correctly" (Maitra, 2003, p. 27) . Early-period Putnam argued that "there is exactly one true and complete description of the way the world is" (Putnam, 1990, p. 30 ; see also Putnam, 1981) , that this world is a Klein, Herskovitz / PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 315 mind-independent reality (Putnam, 1981, p. 49) , and that the function of theory "is to 'discover' the correct description of the world" (Maitra, 2003, p. 5) .
Putnam asserted that either our theories are at least approximately true or "the success of science is a miracle" (Putnam, 1978, p. 18 ). Maitra (2003) If truth relies entirely on what we can verify and not necessarily on some correspondence to things in the world, then the enormous success that science has achieved in explaining and predicting various things about the world would seem to be a "miracle." (p. 4) According to early-period Putnam, verificationism fails to account for the success of science. Citing an unpublished essay by the philosopher of science Richard Boyd, Putnam (1975a) endorsed Boyd's argument "that even if verificationism could give a correct description of the practice of scientists, it lacks any ideas which would enable one to explain or understand why scientific practice succeeds" (p. xi). For early Putnam, scientific realism provides the explanation for the success of science: Science succeeds because its theories are true or approximately true.
As far as Popper's philosophy of science, Putnam (1974) attacked the falsificationist criterion of demarcation as not accurately reflecting the way science is actually practiced:
Failure to see the primacy of practice . . . leads Popper to the idea of a sharp "demarcation" between science, on the one hand, and political, philosophical, and ethical ideas, on the other. This "demarcation" is pernicious, on my view; fundamentally, it corresponds to Popper's separation of theory from practice, and his related separation of the critical tendency in science from the explanatory tendency in science. (p. 238) Under early Putnam's scientific realist perspective, a scientific theory's long-term record of making correct predictions is grounds enough for accepting the theory as at least approximately true. Hence, a sole verification-or for that matter, any number of verifications over the short term-fails to provide sufficient justification for a theory's acceptance as true for the most part. "We judge the correctness of our ideas by applying them and seeing if they succeed; in general, and in the long run, correct ideas lead to success, and ideas lead to failures where and insofar as they are incorrect" (Putnam, 1974, p. 238) .
It is in the long run where the differences between early Putnam and Popper are brought into sharp focus. For Putnam, a theory's long-term record of predictive success warrants its acceptance as at least approximately true and thereby allows scientists to rely on the theory with confidence as a "guide to action" (Putnam, 1974, p. 222) . On Popper's view, a theory with such a record of predictive success nevertheless remains a "provisional conjecture" for there is "no suggestion at all [by Popper] that a law which has withstood severe tests is likely to withstand further tests, such as the tests involved in an application or attempted application" (Putnam, 1974, p. 222) . Putnam (1974) asserted that under a Popperian falsificationist scheme,
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Scientists would never tell us that any law or theory is safe to rely upon for practical purposes; and it would be unimportant for the purpose of understanding, since on Popper's view, scientists never tell us that any law or theory is true or even probable. Knowing that certain "conjectures" (according to Popper all scientific laws are "provisional conjectures") have not yet been refuted is not understanding anything. (p. 223) With respect to falsifications, Putnam, like Quine (1990) and Kuhn (1970a) , refused to adopt Popper's convention of rejecting a theory on the basis of a single counterinstance. Putnam (1974) advanced and adapted the views of Kuhn (1970b) , who held that scientists generally do not engage in Popperian falsification for scientists do not abandon theories because they do not withstand tests. Rather, the majority of the work that scientists routinely do-"normal science"-is governed by a paradigm that structures a scientific discipline and that renders theories resistant to being overthrown. A paradigm as defined by Putnam (1974) is "simply a scientific theory together with an example of a successful and striking application" (p. 229). According to Kuhn (1970b) , the work of scientists during the normal science period consists of "puzzle solving," which Putnam (1974) characterized as "searching for explanations of phenomena" (p. 230).
In contrast to Popper's methodological rule against employing ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses to save a theory from falsification, early Putnam (1974) endorsed Quine's (1964 Quine's ( , 1990 ) and Kuhn's (1970a) views that it is acceptable to modify and thereby rescue theories by various ad hoc adjustments. For Putnam, the importance of Kuhn's paradigm concept is that in structuring a discipline, a paradigm encourages ad hoc adjustments to paradigmatic theories, thereby rendering these theories resistant to falsification during the period of normal science and making scientific progress possible. " [Paradigmatic] theories, during their tenure in office, are highly immune to falsification; that tenure of office is ended by the appearance on the scene of a better theory [under a new dominant paradigm]" (Putnam, 1974, p. 234) .
We argue that the practice of computer simulation validation does not conform to early-period Putnam's scientific realist philosophy of science. Under a Putnamean perspective, a single successful attempt at model validation does not provide adequate justification for accepting the model as true for this can be done only after a long-term record of predictive success. In this respect, a Putnamean stance may be even more skeptical than the Popperian and Quinean positions, which would accept the model as true for now, the best that one has at present. Such a profound skepticism concerning the validation of the model would lead to paralysis as the model developer cannot even "rely upon it tentatively, with a certain caution" (Putnam, 1974, p. 222) .
On an early-period Putnamean view, after a validated model has met with predictive success over the long run, we have sufficient warrant to accept the model as at least approximately true. However, if one were to adopt such a position, there would be no motivation to periodically reassess and revalidate the model as there would be little reason to revisit the issue of the model's validity when the model is true enough. Such a scenario is suggested by Simon's (1976 Simon's ( , 1982 notion of "bounded rationality," which posits that individuals take cognitive shortcuts by making decisions that are not Klein, Herskovitz / PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 317 perfectly rational and not based on perfect information but that are "good enough," thereby "satisficing" instead of maximizing (see also Korobkin & Ulen, 2000; Mitchell, 2002; Prentice, 2003) . The Putnamean developer of the model may reason: "If the model is already true for the most part, why expend additional time, effort, and money to make the model just a bit truer?" As far as model validation failure, an early-period Putnamean approach, like the Quinean and Kuhnian ones, allows ad hoc adjustments to rescue a theory, thereby making it possible to explain away a failed validation attempt (e.g., the model developer used improper measures). Accordingly, under such a Putnamean perspective, there can be no conclusive rejection of a model, and so there are no incentives for model improvement.
Conclusion
In this article, we have examined three contrasting philosophies of science-that of Popper, Quine, and early-period Putnam-to provide computer simulation validation with a theoretical framework and to explore the nature of "truth" derived from the testing of computer simulation models. We have argued that the philosophy of science perspective that is adopted by the model developer determines whether progress is made in computer simulation. A consideration of the Popperian, Quinean, and early Putnamean approaches reveals that it is the Popperian framework that model developers actually use-and should use-when evaluating the validity of a computer simulation model and that it is this framework that makes possible the achievement of progress in computer simulation. Both from a descriptive and normative vantage point then, the endeavor of computer simulation validation is a Popperian enterprise.
18
Both Popper and Quine adopted a nonfoundationalist stance of critical skepticism but advanced very different, conflicting philosophies of science. According to a Popperian falsificationist view, a computer simulation model cannot ever be conclusively proven true but rather merely "corroborated" for the meantime, thereby encouraging periodic reassessment of a validated model's continuing validity. However, under such a Popperian perspective, a model can be definitively falsified as a matter of "reasoned convention" (Laudan, 1990, p. 88) .
In contrast to a Popperian falsificationist position, a Quinean holistic approach regards with ambiguity and uncertainty a model's falsification (as well as its verification). On a Quinean view, falsified models, even as a practical matter, cannot be conclusively rejected, thereby undermining the work of model developers, who need decision rules when to reject models so that attempts can be made to construct potentially better alternative models.
According to an early-period Putnamean scientific realist philosophy of science, a foundationalist position, a validated simulation model with a long record of predictive success corresponds, at least in most respects, to reality and can be regarded as correctly, at least for the most part, modeling the real world. Such an approach discourages periodic reassessment of the model because a model developer will have no
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incentive to build a better model when the validated model is already deemed true or mostly true. Under a Putnamean perspective, one successful validation alone does not justify acceptance of a model as true. Failed validations however fall prey to the Quinean infirmity whereby model falsifications are deemed ambiguous and inconclusive, leaving model developers without any decision rule.
The central argument of this article is that a Popperian falsificationist perspective encourages the improvement of computer simulation models, whereas the Quinean holistic and the early-period Putnamean scientific realist approaches discourage it. Such a Popperian stance allows developers of simulation models to aim at the truth. However, model developers should bear in mind Popper's (1934 Popper's ( /1959 ) assertion concerning science's inability to establish absolute truth with absolute certainty:
Science is not a system of certain, or well-established, statements; nor is it a system which steadily advances towards a state of finality. Our science is not knowledge (episteme): it can never claim to have attained truth, or even a substitute for it, such as probability. . . . Although [science] can attain neither truth nor probability, the striving for knowledge and the search for truth are still the strongest motives of scientific discovery. (p. 278) According to Popper's philosophy of science, then, "there is an absolute truth that we may seek. But . . . we are incurably fallible and can never be sure we have found it" (Notturno, 1995, p. 17) .
Notes
1. Putnam abandoned the scientific realist approach of his early-period writings and in fact changed his mind twice about realism, advocating internal (framework-relative) realism in his middle-period and commonsense (pragmatic) realism in his later writings (see Norris, 2002; Sosa, 1993) . On Putnam's philosophical development, see Ambrus (1999) , Maitra (2003) , Norris (2002) , Putnam (1996), and Sosa (1993) . "In almost every field of philosophy to which Putnam has contributed he has changed his views" (Maitra, 2003, p. 5) . Commenting on Putnam's revisions of philosophical positions, Passmore (1985) remarked that "there are those who would say that to write about 'Putnam's philosophy' is like trying to capture the wind with a fishing-net" (p. 92). Notwithstanding Putnam's disavowal, scientific realism is a dominant perspective in contemporary philosophy of science, and Putnam's formulation in his early writings is representative of current realist approaches.
2. The validation of a computer simulation model needs to be distinguished from verification, which is "the process of comparing the conceptual model with the computer model" (Rohrer, 2000 (Rohrer, , p. 1213 . Similarly, Law and Kelton (2000) defined verification as "concerned with determining whether the conceptual simulation model (model assumptions) has been correctly translated into a computer 'program,' i.e., debugging the simulation computer program" (p. 264). Once the model is verified and the model developer and the client are "convinced that the model is working as intended" (Kelton, Sadowski, & Sturrock, 2004, p. 541) , the model developer needs to validate the model by comparing the predictions generated by the model with the results from the real-world system.
3. The disciplines of philosophy of science and law are inevitably intertwined as both are concerned with the validity and sufficiency of evidence in support of propositions (see Dobbin & Gatowski, 1999; Edmond & Mercer, 1998; Huber, 1991; see also Johnson, 1995) . Moreover, judges are frequently called on to assess scientific evidence (see Roscoe Pound Foundation, 1998; see also Angell, 1996; Daniels, 1996) .
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4. Another-and less common-approach to hypothesis testing is based on Bayesian statistical inference (Bayes's theorem), which is a method for calculating how new information concerning an event modifies or updates prior expectations concerning the probability of that event (see Cooper & Schindler, 2001; Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 1995) . For discussion of other statistical procedures with respect to simulation validation, see Law and Kelton (2000) . On the use of Bayes's theorem in the context of philosophy of science, see Horwich (1982) and Mayo (1996) .
5. For example, in testing the validity of a simulation model, Balci and Sargent (1981) formulated the following null and alternative hypotheses: "H0: Model is valid for the acceptable range of accuracy under the experimental frame. H1: Model is invalid for the acceptable range of accuracy under the experimental frame" (p. 191).
6. The exception to this convention is classical statistical hypothesis testing in simulation validation. See note 5.
7. There are two potential errors that a researcher can make with respect to classical statistical hypothesis testing. A Type I error (α), also referred to as the level of significance, occurs when the null hypothesis is rejected when in fact it is true, whereas a Type II error (β) occurs when the null hypothesis is not rejected when it is false. The researcher specifies in advance the probability of an acceptable Type I error at some small value, usually .05 or .01. The probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false is known as the power of the statistical test and is equal to 1 -β. Balci and Sargent (1981) applied classical statistical hypothesis testing to simulation validation:
In model validation, the first type of wrong decision corresponds to rejecting the validity of the model when it is actually valid, and the second type of wrong decision corresponds to accepting the validity of the model when it is actually invalid. The probability of making the first type of wrong decision will be called model builder's risk ( ) and the probability of making the second type of wrong decision will be called model user 's risk ( ). (p. 191) According to Balci and Sargent, rejection of the model as invalid when in fact it is valid (model builder's risk) will result in unneeded revision and retesting, driving up the cost of developing the model, whereas not rejecting an invalid model (model user's risk) will result in incorrect decisions, which "can be serious, especially when decisions involving expensive resources are made on the basis of the results of the [invalid] model" (p. 191). Balci and Sargent suggested that "the model user's risk is more important than the model builder's risk" (p. 192) and accordingly advised that "the model user's risk . . . should be kept small in the validation of simulation models" (p. 191). 8. Note that whereas a researcher who conducts an experiment in the real world tests a theory by comparing the outcome predicted by the theory with the experimental result, in simulation validation, a researcher who runs a computer simulation evaluates the theory embedded in the computer simulation model by comparing the output generated by the model with the data from the real world (actual or historical data) that the simulation models.
9. According to Sargent (2003) ,
It is often too costly and time consuming to determine that a model is absolutely valid over the complete domain of its intended applicability. Instead, tests and evaluations are conducted until sufficient confidence is obtained that a model can be considered valid for its intended application. (p. 37)
10. "A model may be valid for one set of experimental conditions and invalid in another" (Sargent, 2003, p. 37) . Model validity, then, is a relative concept involving tradeoffs and a balancing of costs and benefits (see note 9; see also Harmon, Gross, & Youngblood, 1999; Hartley, 1997; Logan & Nitta, 2003; MacKenzie, Schulmeyer, & Yilmaz, 2002; Page, Canova, & Tufarolo, 1997) . For Balci and Sargent (1981) , the two risks inherent in classical statistical hypothesis testing vis-à-vis computer simulation validation-rejecting the model when in fact it is valid and not rejecting the model when in fact it is invalid-"can be decreased at the expense of increasing the sample sizes of observations" (p. 190). Balci and Sargent advised that the model sponsor, model user, and model developer need to make "decisions regarding tradeoffs among the risks, size of acceptable validity range, sample sizes, and the cost of data collection" (p. 190). Kilikauskas et al. (2002) enumerated a number of factors that influence the scope and cost of validation (as well as verification) activities. These factors include size and complexity of the simulation software, availability of information about the model, availability of validation data, application complexity, and application risk, with the latter factor being "probably the greatest driver of V&V [verification and validation] resource requirements" (p. 18). For Kilikauskas et al., "High risk applications (where a wrong answer can produce catastrophic results, or damaging results with high probability) require more resource expenditures on V&V than do low risk applications" (p. 18). Accordingly, Whenever simulation results influence the real world, there is a risk incident to their use. Simulation results must only then become the basis for a decision if they are sufficiently credible with respect to the impact the decision will have and the influence of the simulation results in the decision making process. For example, wrong behavior learned in a training simulator may lead to severe damage or loss of the real system during its operation by the wrongly trained person, or it may even lead to their death. (Kilikauskas et al., 2002, p. 18) 11. See Wallerstein (2004) , commenting that "scientists are subject to many pressures: external ones from governments, influential institutions or persons, peers, internal ones from his or her superego" (p. 11). See also Broad and Wade (1982) , remarking that "in the acquisition of new knowledge, scientists are not guided by logic and objectivity alone, but also by such nonrational factors as rhetoric, propaganda, and personal prejudice" (p. 9).
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12. Note however that American courts have developed the fair use doctrine, codified in the Copyright Act, which allows the public limited use of copyrighted material for various enumerated purposes, including scholarship or research, and accordingly, is a defense to a claim of copyright infringement (see R. C. Edwards, 2000 Edwards, -2001 see also NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 2004; Yu, 2004) .
13. Model developers will not have the right or opportunity to modify or improve a model built by another because they will not have access to the model unless they license the simulation technology and compensate the original model developer or sponsor through royalty payments (e.g., see Newberg & Dunn, 2002) .
14. Under a Quinean naturalized epistemology, "epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject" (Quine, 1969, pp. 82-83) .
15. Kuhn (1970a) referred to ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses as ad hoc adjustments. 16. For example, a researcher with a Quinean perspective would not necessarily view a nonsignificant experimental result obtained by classical statistical hypothesis testing-which calls for the retention of the null hypothesis and by inference, the rejection of the alternative hypothesis-as fatal because this single piece of data contrary to the alternative hypothesis may have been due to measurement error.
17. Scientific realism holds that "the historical development of scientific theories [may] reflect progress by successive approximation to the truth-about unobservables as well as about observables" (Boyd, 2002) , whereas verificationism posits that "no 'nonobservable' entity may be inferred from experience and observation" (Hunt, 1991, pp. 386-387) .
18. An anonymous reviewer of this article offered the insight that although model developers are Popperian falsificationists, users of simulation models are either Quinean holists or early-period Putnamean scientific realists. Sophisticated, or expert, users can be denominated as Quinean holists, making adjustments to the model to compensate for its deficiencies. Lacking the ability to modify models, naïve, or casual, users act like early-period Putnamean scientific realists, purchasing off-the-shelf simulation software, accepting its deficiencies, and relying on its proven track record. Under this suggested typology, then, each of the aforementioned parties, cast in the role of lay philosopher, adopts a philosophy of science that is guided by his or her practical concerns. This typology is consistent with the computer simulation literature, which distinguishes users on the basis of experience (e.g., see Appleton, Patra, Mohamed, & AbouRizk, 2002; Mehta & Rawles, 1999; Ruiter, Sluijs, & Stoutjesdijk, 2000; Stanford & Graham, 1998 ; see also Faria & Wellington, 2004) . With respect to the divergent influences that animate model developers and users and how readily modifiable software can accommodate the concerns of users, Thavikulwat (2004) observed,
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The ideas that motivate innovative development work may have more to do with possibility than with purpose. For example, the possibility that a gaming simulation can be computerized leads some developers to wonder what a computer can do that cannot otherwise be done at all or as well. Obviously, computers can compute, but less obviously, computers compute with software that can be easily modified by the user to the extent allowed by the developer. (p. 244)
